Rigorous data-collection is important for accurate policy analysis. The paucity of data in developing and transition economies makes policy analysis in such countries difficult. The World Bank has attempted to remedy this problem by conducting numerous surveys. This paper explores the rich experiences of the Bank in designing and implementing firm-level surveys. Our exploration leads to a series of lessons and tools that we hope policy makers and researchers can use for creating more effective surveys in the future.
I. INTRODUCTION
The paucity of data on firms in much of the developing world, including China, has hampered analysis and effective policy-making on a range of issues affecting firms and firmgovernment interactions. To help countries analyze the constraints faced by firms and evaluate strategies for improving firm performance, the World Bank has increasingly focused on firmlevel surveys to help build a strong data foundation for enterprises in developing countries and transition economies. Examples of firm-level surveys include the Regional Program on Enterprise Development (RPED) survey in eight African countries, the Industrial Competitiveness Study (ICS) in East Asia, the investment climate surveys currently being conducted in a number of countries (including China), a series of surveys in transition countries, and many surveys on small and medium enterprise (SME) issues in South Asia and South America (see Table 1 for a partial list of World Bank firm-level surveys).
China has already hosted several firm-level surveys, which have facilitated a great deal of research that would have been impossible in their absence. For example, the "CASS" survey, a detailed survey of 769 Chinese state-owned firms undertaken from 1980 to 1989 has greatly increased our understanding of managerial markets in China. Research using these data have revealed, for example, that autonomy and incentives improved total factor productivity (Groves et al., 1994) and that the managerial labor market of Chinese SOEs were functioning reasonably well in the 1980s (Groves et al., 1995) . The findings that the market performed reasonably well begged the question of how well the market performed compared to the Western markets. The same firm-level data provided insights into that question, as well. Mengestae and Xu (2001) found that the CEO pay incentives were significantly weaker than those typically estimated for the United States.
3 Prior to the CASS survey any debate on the subject took place almost completely absent any empirical evidence.
Other surveys in China have begun to shed light on additional issues important to China.
A national survey conducted by the National Statistic Bureau in 1998 focusing on the corporatization wave around 1996-97, for example, has facilitated research into a host of crucial questions. Using that data, Lin and Zhu (2001) found that the state continued to play a dominant role even after a firm was retstructured, though managerial autonomy appeared to increas. Xu, Zhu and Lin (2001) found that firm performance after restructuring increased when managers had decision-making autonomy and shareholder interests were properly represented, and performance decreased when the state maintained ownership and could appoint managers.
These few examples of research on Chinese reforms clearly underscores the usefulness of good firm surveys. They also suggest important areas for future survey work: How has the privatization of small and medium SOEs in the past few years affected performance? What types of privatization have been more successful? Why different regions adopted different approach to privatization? What has been the transition strategies of TVEs? The list of remaining questions can be long.This paper takes stock of recent World Bank firm-level surveys, discussing what researchers have learned from them and how to gather data more consistently and efficiently for policy analysis. The paper aims to provide a discussion of the type of data firm surveys should collect both to answer outstanding policy questions and to begin to provide consistent data that, like the LSMS, would be useful for many objectives. We therefore do not try to present specific survey questions. Instead, we present some data issues surveyors should keep in mind when exploring particular policy questions. One important theme, for example, is an emphasis on asking objective questions that generate data useful for empirical analysis of the underlying issues rather than asking respondents their opinions of problems they face. While we try to avoid suggesting specific questions, we include in the paper an overview of the literature on survey design to help surveyors design their own questions. This last section focuses on common survey pitfalls, how to avoid building bias into the survey instrument, and how to recognize the biases that are sometimes inherent to particular types of survey questions.
Every World Bank survey is generally intended to address a particular issue, often specific to a country and a certain period of time. Thus, it can be difficult to synthesize the lessons that have emerged from these ambitious and often expensive efforts. Still, as the Bank continues to expand its firm-level survey efforts, it is worth investigating what can be learned from its experiences to date. Our choice to concentrate on the World Bank experience only is less limiting than it may at first appears. First, the World Bank has been carrying out many firmlevel surveys in several countries, offering us a representative sample of the obstacles most encountered in the survey design and implementation process. Second, the experience and lessons learned by the World Bank provide an empirical platform we can use to explore the questionnaire design process itself in the second part of this paper.
The paper is structured as follows. We first discuss some general data issues and the bank's experience. We note that to analyze the effects of policy intervention it is often important to collect panel data and to define industries at sufficiently disaggregated levels. We then present a brief overview of World Bank surveys organized by research topic, including technology, incentives, market structure, transaction environment, the role of the state, and the importance of micro data in understanding macro phenomena. We believe that multi-topic firm surveys are more useful for policy analysis because it affords us an opportunity to distinguish alternative hypotheses. In addition, when multiple countries all have such multi-topic firms surveys, the lessons learned from cross-country firm analysis are much richer. Besides the incremental costs, conducting multi-topic surveys also yields net benefits in the long run. If a country has to do surveys on multiple topics, it makes sense to combine them in one survey because some basic characteristics of firms would be asked in each survey. We then move to "questioning questions," in which we review the literature on survey design, highlighting the point that the questions themselves can bias responses and provide some guidelines for recognizing the direction of this bias and minimizing it when possible.
The main lessons of our explorations are discussed in the conclusion. While we focus only on firm surveys conducted by the World Bank, we believe that this discussion is also relevant to policy analysts outside the Bank. Because of its mission to formulate policy recommendations, the World Bank has probably conducted more firm-level surveys in developing countries than any other single institution. As a result of the large number of firmlevel surveys and survey topics, the Bank now possesses enormous institutional knowledge not just from the data collected, but from the survey experiences themselves. The Bank should share this knowledge with its member countries and with other researchers in this field. This paper represents such an attempt.
II. GENERAL DATA ISSUES AND THE BANK'S EXPERIENCE
Rigorous policy analysis requires a great deal of data. For many issues interesting to the students of firms, the data ideally are longitudinal (i.e., firm level information collected at discrete points over time), fairly dissagregated (i.e., industries are defined as narrowly as possible), and contain a small set of standard questions on firm performance. it is inevitable that some firms would be lost from the sample ("sample attrition problem") (see also Glewwe and Jacoby, 1999) . Thus to maintain a reasonable large sample, the initial sample size has to be larger. More importantly, the remaining sample might be less representative of the population if the sample is less representative of the current population or if the sample is less representative of the population that was originally sampled. The choice of panel or cross section depends on the purposes of the survey and the implementation capacity of the team implementing the surveys. Our point regarding panel data is simply that it will be best suited for uncovering the effects of reforms, changes, or policy interventions-the most frequent objective of Bank surveys-and that while it is not always obtainable, it should be a goal to keep in mind when considering a survey.
Surveys should also define industries as precisely as possible and offer detailed information of the industry analyzed. When this type of micro data is collected in panel data sets, it becomes possible to compare the technological progress of particular industries in different countries. Such data allow us to better address important unanswered questions, such as why inter-firm dispersion in productivity is greater in industrialized economies than in developing countries (as suggested in Tybout, 1998) . A variety of reasons (such as a smaller extent of market and excessive regulation) have been suggested. But there is no consensus among the existing empirical work largely because every data set aggregates industries differently, making comparisons nearly impossible (Tybout, 1998) .
Finally, although each World Bank survey is usually designed to address a particular issue, each could be more broadly useful by consistently including a small set of standard questions on firm performance, such as total output and profitability. The survey should also collect price data on the firm's main products, inputs, and investment goods. In addition, the survey becomes more valuable when it contains enough information to assess production efficiency. One can assess production efficiency by estimating production functions, which require measures of output, value added, number of employees, capital stock, and material inputs, or by estimating cost functions, which require information on unit costs, output quantity, and prices of key inputs. 6 Given these necessary ingredients for assessing efficiency, we then may isolate the contribution to productivity changes of various production, technological, and institutional factors. 7 Only a few surveys, such as RPED and ICS, include consistent productivity measures. and (4) Topic-specific surveys, such as on training (Enterprise Training in Developing Countries, Tan and Batra), or on SME problems (CECPS, "Small-and-Medium Industry Impact Evaluation," 1995; and "Enterprise training in developing countries," Tan and Batra).
How well do World Bank surveys meet the data needs outlined above? We begin to address this question below. One lesson from the Bank experience is that surveys are extremely difficult. Thus, while we make the comments below with the ideal data set in mind, we 6 The second method may be preferred. The reason is that the firm chooses its inputs, potentially causing the estimates of the coefficients of the production function to reflect omitted variables and thus not capturing well the contribution of inputs. The second method is less subject to this problem-assuming a non-monopoly market, input prices are determined by the market rather than by the firm. Input prices are thus less likely to be correlated with omitted variables under the control of the firm. In the literature, however, both methods are widely used, presumably because it is easier to obtain measures in the first method.
recognize that in practice surveys may not be able to meet this ideal. Longitudinal surveys are costly and take too long for many Bank operations. Some data, meanwhile, simply do not exist.
Nonetheless, it is instructive to consider what would have made these surveys more useful, and use that knowledge when designing future surveys.
III. SPECIFIC DATA NEEDS AND THE BANK'S EXPERIENCE
In each of the following subsections we give a brief overview of some questions that have yet to be empirically investigated in the context of developing countries, the data that would allow hypothesis testing, and an evaluation of whether existing World Bank surveys have addressed these issues. In particular, we discuss research topics such as the firm itself, market structure, the business environment and its impact on firm's performance, the role of the state, and analysis of the macro-economy through microeconomic data.
Collecting the data necessary to answer these questions is difficult. A surveyor interested in methods of firm financing cannot, for example, simply ask firms whether they face financial constraints. Firms may face incentives to report that they do (any rational firm wants cheaper money), and in any event, some firms have trouble raising funds because they are low-quality firms, not because of economy-wide capital constraints. Instead, surveys must aim to ask factual, empirical, questions whose answers together reveal true information about the firm and thus the economy. 
A. The Firm

Internal Incentives
Internal incentives help align managerial and employee objectives (see Holmstrom and Tirole, 1989 , for a survey). There are many ways to motivate workers, but none have been extensively studied in developing countries.
The most common incentive is the promise of promotion. In theory, a large wage differential between workers at different levels improves performance by spurring employees to work hard in order to advance to the next layer, but this benefit has to be balanced against the loss of control and of information. The tournament literature suggests measuring the number of layers within the firm and wage differential between production workers and managers (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Rosen, 1986) .
The threat of firing can also align worker and manager incentives. Presumably, internal incentives are stronger when involuntary turnover is a real and credible threat. This may be achieved by allowing a certain percentage of contract workers. A high share of temporary workers, however, may have unintended consequences: The threat of firing as a disciplinary option spurs worker incentives, but temporary workers face reduced incentives to accumulate firm-specific human capital while a perception that a firm is eliminating permanent employees can demoralize workers. Since the net effect is unclear, surveys will provide the best source of data to answer this question and provide policy advice. Information on the share of temporary workers, combined with firm productivity measures, will allow us to empirically explore the true effects of this phenomenon. benefits, bonuses, payment method (e.g., piece rate or hourly rate), total wages, non-wage costs, and labor turnover rates. The RPED covers internal incentives most extensively. It asks many useful questions, including the payment scheme (piece rate, time rate, or based on firms' sales), the number of people fired, the presence of a union, overtime pay, and detailed wage data by worker category. An especially innovative feature of the RPED is its survey of a subsample of workers in the surveyed firms, which asked workers about issues such as bonuses, wages, and housing allowances.
Despite the strong advances made by the RPED, Bank surveys leave many questions unexplored. For example, we still know little about pay differences between different levels of workers, and between managers and production workers. Likewise, in few countries and industries do we have any sense of the involuntary turnover rate. Without such data we cannot understand the effects and determinants of firm internal incentives, and whether performance improves with better internal incentives in different countries.
B. Human Capital
Human capital theory emphasizes the importance of schooling, labor market experience, seniority, and training in explaining individual productivity (Willis 1986 ). In the context of firms we should expect these human capital variables to positively impact productivity. The lack of data has thus far prevented us from learning how education and training affect productivity and earning in a large sample of countries with different macro environments and protection of property rights.
Another important economic question is how to finance general and specific human capital investments in firms (Willis 1986 , Becker 1962 , Oi 1962 . General human capital raises a worker's productivity regardless of whether she stays at one firm or moves to another. Specific human capital, on the other hand, is lost if she moves to another firm. Efficiency dictates that the employer should be responsible for much of the costs for specific training, since the worker could not benefit from the training if she moves to another firm. Likewise, there may be little reason for the employer to pay for general training, since the worker could benefit from it even if she moves to another firm. In this case, the worker may pay for the training since she benefits from it wherever she works. It also makes sense for the government to subsidize general training since the economy benefits from more productive workers wherever in the country they work. We have little empirical evidence, however, about the relationship of productivity to labor market experience and how training is financed in different countries. The finding would have policy implications for how governments and firms should approach worker training.
C. Technology
In the long run, technological progress is largely responsible for economic growth. It is therefore important to measure it in developing countries. But what determines technological progress and how can we measure it? These questions are exceedingly difficult to answer, even for large firms in industrialized countries. A common input necessary for technological progress is research and development (R&D) expenditures. However, few firms in developing countries categorize any expenditure as R&D, meaning we must look for alternative measures. One determinant is market structure (discussed in the following section), since it directly impacts technological progress.
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Other aspects of technology can be proxied by equipment vintage, the number of technical personnel and their wages, and purchased foreign inputs and equipment. Sources and 10 Scherer and Ross (1990, p. 660) note that "What is needed for rapid technological progress is a subtle blend of competition and monopoly, with more emphasis on the former than the latter, and with the role of monopolistic elements diminishing when rich technological opportunities exist."
vintage of equipment proxy for technology under the assumptions that newer equipment represents a higher level of technology, and that imported equipment is more advanced. In addition, technological know-how is embodied in technical personnel. A higher percentage of the work force with technical knowledge-engineers and employees with college degrees, for example-represents a more advanced state of technology. Finally, the development literature sometimes considers the relationship between purchased foreign inputs and productivity to be an indicator of the firm's level of technology (Tybout, 1998) . 
D. Market Structure
Market structure is one of most important determinant of aggregate firm behavior and performance. It thus is useful to compare the market structure across countries in the same industries to explore whether competition leads to faster innovation and superior performance.
In addition to the extent of the market, economists have also focused on concentration, the scope and the extent of the firm (Viscusi, Vernon, And Harrington, Jr., 1990) .
Concentration. Two hypotheses about the implication of concentration lead to
dramatically different policy recommendations. The first hypothesis is collusion. Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington (1990) note that "the more concentrated an industry is, the less competitive are firms and thus the higher is the price-cost margin." In this case, it is desirable to break up highly concentrated industries. The second hypothesis is Demsetz's superior efficiency hypothesis. That is, superior firms have both higher market shares and larger price-cost margins. Thus, at the firm level, both profitability and price-cost ratios are positively correlated with market shares, and the relationship may be present in a weaker form in the industry level. 11 In this case, the relationship is association, but not causation. The policy implication then is not to break up concentrated industries; the government, after all, does not want to punish firms with superior technology.
The empirical evidence from industrialized countries so far tended to support Demsetz's hypothesis. The evidence is that a firm's profit is strongly correlated with its market share, and the positive association is still observed at the industry level, but in a weaker form (Salinger, 1990; Viscusi, Vernon, And Harrington, Jr., 1990) . But what is the evidence in developing countries? To learn the answers and thus give useful policy advice, we need to collect information about concentration ratios, profitability, price/cost ratios, entry barriers as characterized by license fees to entry, sunk costs (the percentage of the value of equipment can be recouped if the firm is to quit), and the existence of exclusive patents.
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The scope of the firm. The scope of the firm is characterized by its mix of activities (Viscusi, et al., 1990) . Several issues of interest to the Bank and to development more generally may be related to firm scope. For example, firms may be more likely to be vertically integrated in countries with weak contract enforcement. Whether this is true is, again, an empirical question requiring much data to answer. Few World Bank surveys have paid much attention to this matter. To address this question surveys should ask about the firm's lines of business (defined as precisely as possible), whether the firm is a conglomerate (i.e., engaged in unrelated activities), the extent of vertical integration (i.e., produces its main inputs or has its own distribution channels), and whether the firm has any subsidiaries. With these measures, researchers can link productivity with the scope of the firm to see how firm scope changes under different institutional environments.
The extent of markets. Theory suggests that the extent of markets may fundamentally constrain firm development. Some believe that a small market, for instance, may help explain the so-called "missing middle" phenomenon in developing countries-the existence of some large firms and many small firms, but very few middle-sized firms, which are common in industrialized countries. Small markets have also been suggested as a barrier to technological change. Existing Bank surveys tend to neglect this issue. Many surveys can become more useful by asking certain questions about the extent of market: Where firms sell their products, the distance to a major city, and the firm's access to all types of transportation.
Two Bank surveys have made impressive efforts to explore market structure. One, the RPED, asks two especially useful questions: (1) What characterizes a firm's competitors? (None, domestic firms, foreign competitor, or imports). (2) How does the firm set its prices? (Marketprice-taker, markup over costs, in line with imports, price discriminate in different markets, price increases with quality, follow largest competitors, government-set, negotiate-with-the-buyer, or set by a business association). Although the category of "domestic firms" in the first question is rather broad, the second question is especially rich.
The second, Russia: Economic and Civil Society, asks detailed information about market structure:
x How many Russian enterprises the respondent considers to be direct competitors.
x Whether the respondent's firm's most important products compete with imported products from other countries listed.
x Whether the firm is classified as a monopoly producer.
x The ownership structure of input suppliers.
x Whether distribution channels offer credit assistance.
x How the firm sets its prices (e.g., based on production costs, competitors' prices, the target profit level, or willingness-to-pay by the consumers) and how it adjusts price for inflation (e.g., an index based on inflation, own costs, or dollars and exchange rates).
E. Transaction Environment
Transaction costs economics (Williamson 1989 (Williamson , 1993 notes that incomplete information and the potential for opportunistic behavior prevent contracts from specifying outcomes under every uncertain contingency. Firms thus establish various types of relationships -including contracts-with suppliers, dealers and customers. Maintaining many types of relationships entails distinct benefits and costs for firms. These myriad relationships require time and productive resources, but allow degrees of specialization and different levels of investments.
Researchers therefore must study contractual arrangements that facilitate adaptation and dispute settlement such as the legal system, arbitration, long-term contract, and vertical integration.
Transaction cost economics suggest that to better understand the impact of these costs on firm performance we should have at least a minimum set of information about the principal characteristics of firm's exchanges including the frequency with which they occur, the degree and type of uncertainty to which they are subject, and the condition of asset specificity (Williamson, 1989) .
When asset specificity is important, theory suggests that the parties will arrange Bank surveys have collected a significant amount of data on these issues, especially in recent years. Four major surveys-RPED, ICS, Bosnia, and Survey of Russian Enterprises-all gather detailed information on the type of relationships firms had and the devices used to regulate transactions. Together, these surveys yield a rich picture of the environment in which firms operate. The following extracts from existing bank surveys may serve as nice recipes for future surveys on transaction environments:
x The nature of contract: Do contract specifications cover price, methods of adjusting price to rate of inflation, quantity, quality, delivery date, method of payment, warranty, penalty for late payment, penalties for breach of contract, and the method of resolution if a dispute arises? (RPED Survey and the survey of Russian Enterprises).
x The contractual relations with suppliers, with subcontractors, and with clients: ownership, payment method, frequency of purchase, relationship with the firm, whether the other party comes from the same ethnic group, whether there is a trade discount, whether there is subcontracting, the amount of credit purchase, interest, guarantee to supplier (none, physical collateral, third-party checks, witnesses, signed invoices, group guarantees); whether using written contracts more frequently with new trading partners than old trading partners;
whether using written contracts more frequently with new private enterprises than other new trading partners? (The survey of Russian Enterprises).
x Informal lending: the amount, maturity, the existence and amount of collateral, and provisions in case of default? (RPED survey)
The data gathered through these surveys has allowed researchers to better understand the role of contracts and legal institutions on firm's performance. In particular, Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman (1999) focus on the importance of laws and legal institutions for Russian enterprises by asking how laws facilitate transactions. They examine the significance of legal institutions in the transacting process. Their analysis suggests that firms that invest in constructing contracts and have better knowledge of the law have better chances to successfully complete a transaction
To illustrate the potential advances in research on transaction costs, consider the example of credit access. The World Bank's efforts to collect data on this particular type of costs have already allowed researchers to explore more closely the theorized link between credit access and firm performance. Fan, Lee and Schaffer (1996) , for example, analyze the impact of the financial sector reform in Russia on firms in the early years of transition. Their data, collected at the end of 1994, shows that a partial reform of the banking system, with many banks still acting "soft" in their dealings with firms, slowed the enterprise restructuring process and undermined financial sector reform. Bank loans are not the firm's only source of financing, especially when credit is rationed or the credit market is underdeveloped. A recent study on Zimbabwean manufacturing firms using the RPED data (Fafchamps, 1996) suggests that trade credit is an important, alternative source of short-term liquidity for many firms.
F. The Role of the State
Even in industrialized countries, the state is generally the most important single actor in the economy. The policies the government implements can both harm and benefit economic growth. As Stiglitz (1998) notes, "there is a growing consensus that governments can play a vital role in successful development efforts, but we also recognize that the wrong kind of government intervention can be highly detrimental." Surveys of firms can therefore be an important tool in determining which aspects of government involvement are beneficial and which are harmful.
Regulation
Despite its potential importance in explaining different growth rates across nations, little is known empirically about regulation in developing countries. For instance, how does regulation affect firm performance, employment, and pricing? What determines the extent and the types of regulation that the government of a developing country adopts? Do regulations change over time? Given the profound implications for firm productivity and innovations, further research should address the impacts and the determinants of regulation in developing countries. To accomplish this research agenda it is important to gather data on, for example, pricing behavior, service coverage and quality, profitability, market structure, rent distribution (i.e., were employment and wages affected by regulatory changes), and dynamic efficiency (measured by the rate and direction of innovation and productivity).
World Bank surveys probably have focused more on regulation than any other theme, although the variation in coverage is vast across surveys. Those that cover regulation thoroughly (the Bosnia Survey, the World Business Environment Survey, The Emergence of Private Sector:
Hungary, and the RPED) ask questions about the waiting period for goods to arrive, the level of government to deal with in regulation, the main problems in dealing with government agencies, the frequency with which firms are required to meet with government officials, the costs of facilitators necessary for dealing with the government, the burdens of licensing requirements, costs of obtaining licenses and permits, various types of taxes, tax treatments for profits reinvested in company, and incentives for investment in new machinery and equipment.
A general problem with current Bank surveys on regulation, however, is that they focus on the perceived barriers that regulations impose on business. They tend to ask firms "how severe" certain regulations are to firm operations. It is true that burdensome and often unnecessary regulations are common. However, many regulations that appear costly to individual firms are important to the functioning of the economy (e.g., environmental regulations that force firms to internalize all costs of their production). In those cases, the regulation will be an obstacle from the firm's perspective, but efficient from the perspective of the entire economy.
Surveyors need to think carefully about how to uncover the true costs of regulation, since estimates will be biased upwards by simply asking the firm whether a regulation is an obstacle.
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)
Developing countries claim a higher share of SOEs in their economies than do industrialized countries (Haggarty and Shirley, 1997) . While SOEs resemble private firms in many respects, surveys of SOEs must ask some different questions. These differences reflect the different objectives of SOE management and objectives--SOE principals are typically bureaucrats or politicians (whose incentives differ from private shareholders and creditors). In particular, the following are potentially important for understanding SOEs behavior in developing countries.
x Cash flow rights. What tax rate does the SOE face? Does it adjust from year to year? Does the state charge different rates for different SOEs? Since the state may use taxes as a transfer mechanism, it is useful to see the extent to which the government uses it for this purpose.
How do tax rates of SOEs differ from those of comparable private firms? Does the government subsidize or bailout SOEs when they are in financial trouble? Next, we provide a brief overview of the most important theoretical macro-economic issues, which can benefit from this micro approach to macro-analysis, and of the (limited) empirical testing done using World Bank surveys.
Growth and Investment
An important aspect of macro-economic analysis is the link between growth and investment. In particular, recent studies suggest that the rate of investment is positively linked to the rate of growth. To better understand this link, researchers have focused on the determinants of the investment decision and found that this decision depends on financial constraints, the risks firms face, and the productivity of investment itself (Jenskin, 1998; Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor, 1999) . This line of research, however, has used mainly aggregate (country-level) data.
The problem with this approach is that aggregate data fails to capture heterogeneity across firms and non-linearities in investment decisions recently highlighted by a new stream of works (Doms and Dunne, 1994; Caballero, et al, 1995; Cooper, et al, 1995) .
The problems of an "aggregate" approach to the study of investment decisions are even more evident by comparing two recent studies on investment productivity and growth in Africa.
The first -Devarajan, et al (1999) -focuses on investment productivity using cross-country data.
Contrary to the aforementioned theoretical predictions, the authors find that neither public nor private investment significantly impacted growth and output in Africa over the past three decades. To reconcile the empirical findings with the theoretical predictions, the authors integrate cross-country exploration with firm-level data on investment in the manufacturing sector in Tanzania. This analysis suggests that the low level of investment can be partially attributed to the low productivity of capital for African firms. The low level of productivity of capital then explains the absence of a cross-country correlation between growth performance and investment.
The second study -Gunning and Mengistae (1999) -on the other hand reaches a different conclusion: the productivity of capital for African firms has increased over the past ten years. In particular, the authors explore the rate and the productivity of investment using firm-level panel data collected by the RPED in eight African countries. Their detailed data set contains information on capital stock and market structure and helps document low levels of investment as well as heterogeneity in firm and investment productivity in the African manufacturing industries. They conclude that manufacturing firms are profitable and that investment productivity has improved in the past ten years. 14 These results, in contrast with the findings of Devarajan et al. (1999) , suggest that solving the puzzle of the low level of investment and the weak link between investment and growth in Africa may require exploring more closely other determinants of investment, such as the degree of reversibility or risk.
Micro panel data on characteristics of capital stock and firm productivity could improve our understanding of the link between investment and growth. Unfortunately, this type of data is not readily available. Bank coverage has improved recently with the implementation of the three waves of the RPED surveys. But we need more detailed survey data to enhance our understanding of investment dynamics. In particular, very limited information is available on the fixed costs of investment, the degree of reversibility or on the perceived risk that firms associate to a certain investment decision.
Unemployment and the labor market
Recently, researchers have investigated the high rates of job creation and job destruction experienced by market economies. 15 This continuous reallocation of resources, which occurs within industries and is somewhat obscured by the aggregate measures of unemployment, is an important part of economic adjustment and growth. The smoothness of these reallocation processes impacts economic performance by affecting the evolution of firms and industries and thus productivity growth. Reallocating jobs and factor inputs from less efficient to more efficient plants may help improve industry-level productivity in an environment with frictions and imperfect information (Baily, Hulten and Campbell 1992, and Olley and Pakes 1996) . The same theoretical approach, which allows for frictions in reallocating workers and jobs, helps also to shed light on business cycle behavior of gross worker flows (Mortensen, 1994; Ramey and Watson, 1997 The East Asia survey collects detailed information on the workforce, but has limited data on average tenure. The Labor section of the RPED questionnaire focuses on the structure of the workforce, but less on the dynamic aspect of employment flows. The RPED collects information on seasonal hires, apprentices, paid and unpaid relatives of the owner, but mainly for the second or third waves of the survey. In addition, the usefulness of the data is limited by consistency problems across countries in terms of the survey instruments used. The Estonia and Poland data sets document in great detail the employment dynamics experienced by these countries between 1989 and 1995, using both official government data and information collected through a labor force survey.
Responses to Crises and Institutional Changes
Following the transition from a planned to a market economy, Eastern European and former Soviet countries experienced a larger-than-expected decline in aggregate activities.
Recent important studies have looked for causes of this output collapse. Ex ante, researchers agreed that output may initially decline before resuming its growth as the market reallocated resources from less to more productive uses. Borensztein and Ostry (1995) hypothesize that the sharp fall was mainly the result of a supply side shock: as prices were liberalized, state owned enterprises were unable to pay for inputs. Commander and Coricelli (1992) , and Borensztein, et al. (1993) emphasize a demand shock: the increase in prices reduced the domestic demand for final goods. Berg (1994) , Atkeson and Kehoe (1996) , and Shimer (1995) argue that structural adjustments related to the transition itself were the main cause of the initial decline. Finally, Murphy, et al (1992) and Shleifer and Vishny (1993) focus on the political economy of the transition process and emphasized the perverse effects of a partial price liberalization reform and government corruption. Another dimension of particular interest to policy-makers is firm responses to macro shocks. Since this type of analysis has a less defined set of theoretical hypotheses and may be more specific in scope, it is difficult to evaluate the coverage of the World Bank surveys.
Instead, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of recent surveys undertaken in response to macro-economic crises.
Research on transition economies mentioned above is a natural starting point since they provide some information on how firms react to shocks or changes in the environment in which they operate. Earle, Estrin and Leshchenko (1996) , for example, focus on the privatization process and its impact on firm performance. Using survey data collected in Russia in 1994, the authors analyze the effects of different ownership structures on firm behavior. Their findings suggest that outsider-owned and state-owned firms differ significantly in terms of performance and but less in terms of restructuring behavior. The latter result may be partly a function of the profitability. Pinto, Belka and Krajewski (1992) complement Estrin et al. (1993) 's results with a study of the state enterprises in Poland before and after the first round of reforms. Their analysis reveals that firms, helped by an underdeveloped banking system, initially postponed the inevitable restructuring process. The decline in real wages and the increase in interest rates appear to be therefore responsible for the collapse in output.
timing of the survey (it was conducted only two years into the transition process) and, consequently, the restructuring process had made only limited progress.
17 Recanatini and Ryterman (1999a and 1999b) 
IV. QUESTIONING QUESTIONS
Having discussed the type of data that would be most useful for firm surveys to gather, we now turn to the subject of questionnaire design itself. We do not suggest specific questions; instead, we review the literature on survey design to present important issues researchers must keep in mind when designing surveys. Surveys generally ask respondents both about their attitudes towards various issues and their recollection of past factual events. It is therefore important to consider how the questions themselves can influence responses. In particular, this section discusses how the survey design itself affects responses to questions, and therefore conclusions the researcher may draw from those responses. 17 The timing of these surveys and their "once for all" approach seriously limit the usefulness of these data sets.
Especially when focusing on macro-economic issues it is important to analyze cross-country time series. Unfortunately, most of these surveys are not repeated over time, making it difficult to test both the existing alternative theories and the validity of the survey instruments used.
General Issues
Rea and Parker (1997) note six general problems to consider when preparing questions:
(1) an inappropriate level of wording; (2) ambiguous words and phrases; (3) multipurpose questions (i.e., questions that ask two or more opinions simultaneously); (4) manipulative information; (5) inappropriate emphasis; and (6) emotional words and phrases.
Additional problems include questions that can be answered differently by people with the same opinion and questions that can be answered identically by people with opposite opinions. Many of these problems are obvious, but some of their manifestations are not. For example, a simple "yes/no" question can accidentally be manipulative or suggest to the respondent that there is a correct response by not including all possible responses in the question itself. A question that simply asks, "Do you do x?" may make the respondent more likely to answer "yes" since the alternative was not presented. One possibility is to ask instead, "Do you do x, or not?" (Fowler 1995 ). An induced response is more of a concern when one answer to a question is more socially acceptable than another. We discuss issues in asking sensitive questions below.
Asking multipurpose questions-questions that ask about more than one issue or along more than one dimension-turns out to be unfortunately simple and common. For example, the World Business Environment Survey (World Bank 1998) asks respondents to "rate the overall quality, integrity, and efficiency of services delivered by the following public agencies or services." Although quality, integrity, and efficiency are probably highly correlated, they are three separate issues and should be asked separately. Sometimes, however, the problem is less obvious. "Agree/disagree" questions, for example, usually ask the respondent to rate how much she agrees or disagrees with a statement. The survey asks the respondent whether she "strongly agrees, agrees, disagrees, or strongly disagrees." The problem with this scale is that it combines an emotional component ("strongly") with the more important cognitive component. Instead, the survey should ask whether the respondent "completely agrees, generally agrees, generally disagrees, or completely disagrees" (Fowler 1995) .
Careful survey writing can minimize problems of the sort described above. Other problems are more complicated. Small differences in question wording, for example, can generate large differences in responses. A particularly well-known example is from a 1941 experiment in which matched samples of respondents were asked one of two questions (Sudman, Bradburn, and Schwarz 1996) . The first group was asked whether they thought the United States "should allow public speeches against Democracy," while the second group was asked whether they thought the United States "should forbid speeches against Democracy." Among the first group, 21 percent favored free speech. Among the second group, 39 percent favored free speech.
Either question may be useful in tracking changes in perceptions, as long as the same question is asked consistently across people and over time. That is, whichever question is asked, the exact same question must be asked of every respondent. While it seems obvious to ask all respondents exactly the same question, in practice interviewers often deviate from the survey script. Fowler and Mangione (1990, p.35 ) note four studies that tracked interviewer-respondent interactions found that interviewers deviated from their script on 20 to 40 percent of the questions on the survey.
It is not possible to ensure that all interviewers follow the script to the letter all the time.
Indeed, turning interviewers into little more than programmed question-readers could bias answers by preventing the interviewers from interacting properly with the respondent.
Nonetheless, survey designers can take steps to minimize this source of error. Specifically, the survey designer should recognize that the more likely a respondent is to interrupt the question, the more likely the interviewer is to change the question wording. The survey writer should design questions that need little additional explanation. Pretests can measure which questions respondents tend to interrupt for clarification or which questions seem most likely to lead to adlibbing by the respondent. The researcher can use the pretest information to change the questionnaire to minimize opportunities for the interviewer to change the written question.
The issues discussed above are general ones to keep in mind when developing and implementing a survey. Many more specific issues are inherent to most surveys. Those issues are discussed in the sections below.
Response scales
Many surveys ask respondents to rate issues on some scale (say, 1 to 5). In World Bank surveys, such questions typically ask about infrastructure, regulation, or competitors. If phrased properly, such questions may tell us what a firm views as problematic relative to other issues presented in the questionnaire. Such methods, however, should be used with caution. They are inherently subjective and respondent-specific, making interpretation difficult. In addition, respondents may have distinct criteria in judging the severity of a problem, making it impossible to divine the cause of the response. If the goal is to determine, from an economic perspective, how the issues under study affect economic growth it is better to ask for objective measures and use that data to determine their economic impacts empirically rather than asking firms to rate them on a scale. For example, rather than asking managers whether labor costs are a problem, ask for wages and productivity measures. Empirical analysis can then determine whether labor costs in a particular industry-country context are, in fact, higher than in other industry-country contexts, or whether those costs have changed over time or in response to some policy intervention.
Sometimes, however, it may be impractical or impossible to avoid the rating method.
Other times the objective may be explicitly to measure manager opinion, in which case the rating method is appropriate. When one must rely on ratings, it is important to consider how to interpret scales, the costs and benefits of numeric and verbal scales, and the optimal number of responses. Below we synthesize the recommendations from the survey literature on these issues.
Ordinal scale measurement is relative
A scale allows us to measure how people feel about an issue relative to the scale presented, but not necessarily how they feel in any absolute sense. Consider a question that provides respondents with the possible answer set A {good, fair, or poor}. The same question that provides respondents with possible answer set B {excellent, good, fair, or poor} will not simply divide the "good" responses of set A into subcategories. Instead, the meanings of all the possible answers change in set B relative to set A, so that the meaning of the words "good" or "fair," for example, are not comparable across sets A and B.
Numeric versus verbal scales: Advantages and Disadvantages
The main advantage of numeric scales is that they allow greater variation in responses without descriptive adjectives for each category. The main disadvantage is that the anchors of the scale may affect responses. For example, a survey asking "how successful have you been in life" found that on a scale of 0 to 10, 34 percent of respondents answered between 0 and 5, but on a scale of -5 to 5 only 13 percent answered between -5 and 0 (Sudman, Bradburn, and Schwarz 1996) .
The main advantage of using descriptive adjectives for each category is that each category can be relatively well-defined. The main disadvantage of descriptive adjectives is that it is difficult to come up with meaningful and unambiguous adjectives to use on a multi-point scale.
Indeed, "a problem in international research . . . is how to get consistent measurement of subjective states for different cultural groups. In particular, when scales are defined adjectivally, it has been found that it is virtually impossible to have exact translations across languages . . . .
Numerical response scales, with only the ends of the continuum defined, perhaps with some general discussion of how to use the points between the extremes, have numerous advantages and constitute a very good way to have people perform some rating tasks" (Fowler, 1995) .
Number of categories
The researcher also must decide how many categories of responses to include. The number of responses often varies by survey and by question within the survey. Researchers-and econometricians in particular-wish to maximize variation among respondents as much as possible, which suggests a larger number of potential responses. On the other hand, Fowler (1995) notes that studies show that more than 10 categories does not increase variation in responses and that respondents seem to be able to meaningfully differentiate between five to seven categories, but not more.
The "Don't Know" Problem
Every survey wrestles with the problem of whether to include a "don't know" or "indifferent" category. Research on the topic is mixed (Gilljam and Granberg 1993 Researchers offer differing advice, although they all recognize that the answer is unclear.
Gilljam and Granberg (1993) ask and conclude, "Should public opinion researchers take don't know for an answer? Our view is that we don't know for sure, but probably should not." Sudman, Seymour, and Bradburn (1982, p.141), however, note that "[w] hile it is impossible to make any hard and fast rule, our advice would be contrary to general practice: include the middle category unless there are persuasive reasons not to." Fortunately, the positive/negative response ratio seems to remain relatively constant regardless of whether the survey offers a middle option (Sudman, Seymour, and Bradburn 1982) .
The important conclusion from the "don't know" debate is that the number of respondents expressing neutrality will be biased upwards if the survey includes a "don't know" or "indifferent" category, and that the number of respondents expressing an opinion will be biased upwards if the survey does not include this option.
The "how great an obstacle" question
Many World Bank surveys ask "how concerned" the respondent is about an issue, or "how problematic" a particular regulation is to firm growth. Allowed responses typically range from "not concerned" (or "no obstacle") to "very concerned" (or "severe obstacle"). Although it is not obvious, this answer set is biased and thus leads to biased responses. It presents only half the "response distribution" by not allowing firms to say that they favor the issue or regulation in question. This bias conveys to the respondent that the interviewer believes the issue is an
obstacle. An unbiased response scale, therefore, would include as many positive as negative responses, with "no obstacle" as the middle, indifferent, category. Presenting "not concerned" or "no obstacle" as an endpoint in effect truncates the positive responses.
For example, The World Bank often wishes to measure whether institutional features of a country impede firm growth. Such surveys often ask firms to rate regulations or potential production bottlenecks from "no obstacle" to "major obstacle." These questions may suggest to the firm that the interviewer believes that the issues in question are, in fact, obstacles. In effect, the question leads the respondent to an answer, and thus to biased results. An acceptable, although perhaps unlikely, response is also that the regulations are "very helpful," and the firm should be allowed the possibility of responding that way.
A survey that aims to uncover true economic effects should, as discussed above, try to avoid these subjective questions altogether and instead ask for objective measures and uncover the answer through empirical analysis. Sometimes, however, these questions may be unavoidable. In that case, the surveyor must recognize the potential bias in the question and work to minimize it. Including both sides of the response distribution may minimize the bias, but may also seem awkward (e.g., it is hard to imagine a firm reporting that tax inspectors are "very helpful"). The way to deal with this problem is to include "filters and branching" in the question.
"Filters and branching" refer to questions that guide the respondent down a decision tree.
The survey should first determine whether the respondent has an opinion and then inquire as to the intensity of that opinion. Sterngold, Warland, and Herrmann (1994) found that including a filter that asks respondents whether they were concerned about an issue before asking them how concerned they were dramatically reduced the percentage of respondents expressing concern.
Moreover, the drop in those expressing concern came not just from those who expressed "a little concern," but also among those who were "somewhat" and "very" concerned. The authors concluded that "standard degree-of-concern items may be leading questions that encourage respondents to overstate their concerns about issues."
A side benefit of adding filters to the survey is that they seem to increase response consistency. A common problem with surveys is that respondents typically do not give the same responses to the same questions; that is, a given person's response to any question is noisy. Krosnick and Berent (1993) 
Order Effects
It is well-known that the order in which related questions are asked can impact responses.
Order effects probably occur because additional questions about a topic prod the respondent's memory, making certain recollections easily accessible for future questions. Question order matters when asking about related specific and general questions and about the timing of past events. The order in which responses to a question are presented can matter as well, although the literature does not provide any rules as to how they matter.
Order effects occur within questions, as well. That is, the order in which responses to a question are presented can affect the frequency with which those responses are chosen or rated.
For example, Boardman, et al. (1996) note "a study that asked some respondents to value preserving seals and then whales, while others were asked to value preserving whales and then seals. Seal values were considerably lower when the seal question was asked after the whale 18 The phrasing of the filter question itself will impact the results. The filter must be phrased so that it is unbiased.
For example, if trying to determine whether the respondent is concerned about an issue, ask, "Are you concerned with x, or do you feel it's not a problem?" 19 Sterngold, Warland, and Herrmann (1994) also recognize that including a filter for many questions is "a rather time-consuming and burdensome approach that may encourage respondents to give answers that allow them to bypass the follow-up degree-of-concern questions. An alternative is to use filters intermittently during the course of the survey-especially before the first degree-of-concern response item-to communicate to respondents that [not concerned] is a legitimate response. This may have a carryover effect on other degree-of-concern items in the survey question." Unfortunately, empirical findings on within-question effects are ambiguous. Sudman, Bradburn, and Schwarz (1996) note that "despite the considerable empirical evidence for the emergence of response order effects, we know relatively little about the conditions that determine their emergence and direction, and the area is characterized by a large number of apparently inconsistent findings . . . . Because of the shortcomings in the available data, it is currently impossible to draw strong conclusions about the processes that underlie response order effects in survey measurement." Survey designers may be able to minimize this type of bias by randomizing across respondents the order the responses are presented.
Specific and general questions
Asking respondents specific questions influences how they will answer related general questions-a phenomenon termed "contrast" and "assimilation" effects. Contrast effects occur when specific questions cause the respondent to answer a general question in contrast to the preceding specific (but related) questions. Assimilation effects occur when specific questions cause the respondent to answer the general question as a kind of summary of the preceding specific questions.
For example, suppose a manager in a large firm is asked whether his division is successful and whether his firm, in general, is successful. A contrast effect would influence the manager to rate his division's success relative to the firm's success. An assimilation effect would influence the manager to include his division's success as one of the factors comprising the firm's success.
20 Surprisingly, there is some agreement about when assimilation and contrast effects emerge. As Schul and Schiff (1993) note, "[r] esearch has shown that the impact of early specific questions on the responses to a later general question is influenced by the number of specific that are not preceded by [not concerned filters]. A second alternative is to ask the filter for an entire list of items, and then to cycle back to those items respondents said they were concerned about and ask the follow-up questions."
questions and their positioning in the survey.
[W]hen a general question is preceded by a single specific question, responses to the general question show a contrast effect unless the specific and general questions are separated. " Sudman, Bradburn, and Schwarz (1996) note that asking the specific questions first yields assimilation effects when there are unrelated questions between the specific and general questions. Physically separating the specific and general questions on a selfadministered survey or putting the specific and general questions in different sections of an interviewer-led survey generated assimilation effects. The contrast and assimilation effects are more intense the more sweeping or ambiguous is the general question.
To summarize, a specific question followed immediately by a general question tends to generate a contrast effect, while a specific question followed by several unrelated questions or a section break and then a general question tends to generate an assimilation effect. A general question asked before specific questions or completely absent specific questions may reflect contrast or assimilation effects, but it is unclear which. The survey can minimize such problems by avoiding ambiguity as much as possible and by asking the respondent to answer general questions either to reflect his experiences or actions or what he believes the general condition to be relative to his experiences or actions. That is, ask for a contrast or assimilation of specific questions posed first.
Recent and less-recent behavior
Often the researcher is interested in learning about recent and typical behavior, which are not always identical. Surveys frequently ask whether a respondent has done something within the past x weeks (or months or years) and then within the past x + y weeks. It turns out that asking about the shorter time period first tends to lead respondents to over-report that activity (Fowler 1995) . This over-reporting may happen because of the respondent's desire to report engaging in that activity even if it falls slightly out of the specified time period. Asking about the longer time period first could make the respondent more willing to state that she did not engage in that activity more recently.
Sensitive Questions and Truth-Revealing Mechanisms
Often researchers wish to study behavior that society (or the respondent) considers inappropriate or illegal. For these or other reasons, the respondent may have an incentive to be untruthful when responding to questions. Social scientists typically worry about this problem in the context of drug use or sexual behavior (Fowler 1995, Tourangeau and Smith 1996) . World
Bank firm surveys face similar problems when they ask about firm behavior regarding issues such as corruption, regulation, and taxation. A firm may understandably be reluctant to admit to engaging in illegal activities or to avoiding regulations. While there is no way to guarantee truthful responses, the mode of data collection and the method of asking the question can affect whether respondents admit to embarrassing or illegal behavior. Unfortunately, these suggestions may be of limited usefulness-or will require some creativity to use-in in-person surveys conducted for the purpose of building a large dataset.
Not surprisingly, respondents are less likely to admit to incriminating behavior in a faceto-face interview than in a self-administered survey. Tourangeau and Smith (1996) First, would respondents be more likely to be truthful on a self-administered questionnaire if they know that, despite answering the questions in private, their answers will not be anonymous? On one hand, they can answer the questions in private and not admit their behavior verbally. 21 On the other hand, if the answers can be linked back to their firm it may not matter whether the answer is given in written or oral form. This is, however, an open question and could be tested empirically during the survey pretest phase.
Randomized responses are another way to increase reporting of such behavior Bradburn 1982, Fowler 1995) . As will be clear, this method is especially useful for learning the percentage of a population engaged in certain activities, but by its nature adds substantial measurement error, making hypothesis testing difficult. The method involves presenting the respondent with two questions simultaneously: the sensitive or embarrassing question, and a completely innocuous question. For example, question A might be, "Have you ever bribed a government official?" Question B might be, "Is your birthday in December?" The respondent then flips a coin (not revealing the result to the interviewer) and on seeing heads answers question A and on tails answers question B. The surveyor simply records the response. As a result, the respondent can give a completely truthful response knowing that the surveyor has no way of knowing which question she is answering.
Determining the percentage of a sample that has bribed a government official then becomes simple. Assume that 400 of 1200 respondents answered "yes" to the question. We would expect 50 percent of the respondents to answer the birthday question, and 1/12 of those to answer the question affirmatively. That is, 1200(0.5)/12 = 50 of the "yes" responses were to the birthday question. The expected number of people answering "yes" to the bribery question is therefore 400 -50 = 350. Because 600 (i.e., 1200*0.5) people answered the bribery question we could conclude that 350/600 | 58.3 percent of the sample had bribed a government official. This method complicates hypothesis testing because of the measurement error it introduces, but World
Bank surveys intent on measuring particular behavior in populations could potentially use this method to great effect. 21 It is conceivable that speaking out loud may affect truthfulness, especially since the interviewer is likely to be a citizen of that country, and most likely a local resident.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This review has attempted to examine existing World Bank firm surveys and the state-ofthe-art in questionnaire design. World Bank surveys have perhaps dramatically improved our understanding of firm behavior in developing countries. In addition, most of the data and measurement requirements we spell out in this paper are fulfilled in some surveys, such as the use of panel data, and detailed measurements about various themes. Needless to say, not all Bank surveys should pay heed to the specific themes and hypotheses this paper mentions; we recognize that no survey can address all the concerns raised here given time constraints, ad hoc purposes of specific surveys, and survey costs.
We also recognize that our coverage in this survey of surveys is not comprehensive. A host of questions remain unresolved. How do we check for data quality? How do we know whether the numbers come from a false accounting book? What are the best ways to ask questions? How important is survivor bias and recollection errors? Should we pay interviewees based on the percentage of missing information (Philipson, 1997) ? Nonetheless, if a firm survey
aims to become what LSMS has become for household surveys (that is, an excellent source of data useful for answering a range of questions across countries), it may be worthwhile to consider the observations in this paper as a start towards generating consistent, comprehensive firm data. 
